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"Just as the skill of reading animal tracks will not flourish in a metropolitan setting, so
calls for the virtues of courage and care will remain inconsequential in a material
culture designed to procure comfortable and individualist life .. Putting matters this
way is to clarify also what is at the heart of real ethics. It is not finally the desire for
greater scholarly circumspection or radicality, but rather the readiness to answer to
the claim of eloquent things."
Albert Borgmann:
prelude
"Now say 'thank you."
'Thaaank yooooou. "
"No, come back here! Now say it like you mean it."
There is something painful about the experience of civilizing children into
moral beings. This is not because, in the usual romantic sense, it imposes
orthopaedic strictures on their 'natural free spirits.' It is rather that their having
to be taught how to show the least respect to others, repeatedly and in the
most mechanistic fashion, reveals the fragility and artificiality of what we take
to be best about human beings. Listening to children poorly ape the mere
signifiers of civility, you cannot not have a Nietzchean moment, seeing the
extent to which morality is just a bad habit, a well-rehearsed melodramatic
script replayed naturalistically night after night.
In many ways, this gap between act and actuality exposed by children whining
'thank you', that one hopes is merely a 'developmental' evil on the way to the
good, is the space between morality and ethics. The terms are confused, but I
want to follow poststructural conventions (i.e., the interrelated work of
Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas[2} which hold that the former names
the codified 'performance criteria' that should evidence the presence of the
latter. If ethics represents being just, morality is the culturally and historically
specific indicators of such an outcome. In this context, a code of ethics is, if
not an outright oxymoron, better called a morality.
When children learning manners do not mean what they say, they are
exposing the danger that all educationalists know is associated with
explicating assessment criteria: that these indicators can be replicated without
the 'way of being' that should inherently, not intentionally, generate such
manifestations. The presence of moral conduct does not necessarily mean
the presence of ethical being; the former might just be a set of imitated
character traits. In fact, given that what actually matters is being ethical, the
overt presence of moral behaviour is more often than not an indicator of being
unethical. At one end of the scale, as Derrida notes in an exegesis of
Kant's attempts to find the ethical in the moral, it is not polite to be polite
merely in order to be polite. Deliberately reproducing the behaviours
outlined in a guide to etiquette is potentially offensive. The point is not to
be seen to be, or perhaps even explicitly intend to be, but merely to be,
ethical. At the other end of the scale, the hollow performances of too
intentionally polite children pain us into the recognition of all those people
who, despite following a set of morals to the letter, are nonetheless thoroughly
unethical. Institutional religions of all persuasions seem to be particularly
good, today no more so than at every moment in our histories, at getting
people to conduct themselves according to moral rules so exactly that there
are homocidal and even genocidal consequences. In reaction, one is tempted
to utterly rule out rule-following when it comes to ethics.
Ethicalness then must only be a way of being, not a knowledge about that
way of being. This is the basis of Levinas' Hebraic ethics: do before you know;
ethics comes with being always already hostage to the otherness of the other
such that you are, before all else, for the other in all you do.[6] The
psychoanalytic version of this is Lacan's typically aphoristic formulation, "The
status of unconscious is ethical"; understood in reverse fashion, this
means that ethicalness is utterly distinct from one's conscious intentions. An
intriguing, though very schematic, cross-cultural version is Franciso Varela's
Ethical Know-How:[B] Drawing on his connectionist, autopoietic theories about
cognition, Varela suggests that ethical expertise is dispositional and enactive;
it is the wisdom of the immediate action that is so symbiotic with its
environment that it is best characterised as arising through a distributed-self;
or better, the no-self of Eastern traditional thinking. In the context of design,
Varela's work connects with soft systems, where ethicality is not only the
result of the more comprehensive consideration of ends involved in whole
systems approaches, but is able to manifest in more unconscious or intuitve
ways by being systemic: see for example, Alain Findeli's important essay,
'Ethics, Aesthetics and Design.
Without pressing the point too far in the direction of these radical
(counter)epistemologies - I will return to these toward the end of this article
- it might suffice to use the Greek version of these formulae: ethics only ever
are as an ethos, an essentially lived culture. As 'lived' rather than professed,
ethics only ever appear from the outside; they are what anthropologists (or
originally, theorists)[1 call the mores or rituals particularly to the nature of a
people. The people themselves do not notice their ethics but quite properly
take them for granted. At most, a culture might notice lapses in their ethos,
incidents that are improper or foreign to their way of life that must
consequently be removed. But otherwise, they are moral without having a
morality; which is to say, they interrelate in sustainable ways, in ways that
sustain their sociality, rather than risk damaging it in irreparable ways.
If this is the nature of ethics, to be embedded in the very nature of interactions
beyond knowing, then a culture that has the notion of ethics consciously at
issue, a culture that is trying know what its ethics is or at least codify what it is
that would count as being ethical, a culture that can, and needs to, have
'ethics' as the theme for the issue of a journal for example, is in trouble.
Following the old rule, that if you have to talk about it, you can bet it no longer
exists, such a culture must be trying to refind its lost ethos. But this would be
profoundly problematic. For, if such a culture could ever come to some
agreement about what its ethics was, or should now be, the question would
remain, how to convert this morality back into a cultural ethos? How can such
a culture move beyond being a collection of so many more or less diligent or
recalcitrant children mouthing the words without the requisite feelings? How
can it assure that its adults do not more or less naively or cynically do what
they know they are supposed to do in ways that nonetheless lead to immoral
outcomes? The problem for such a culture is in fact less one of ethics and
more one of ethos: irrespective of what coherent ethical system is elaborated,
how can it possibly come into being? A lack of ethics qua ethos is essentially
a lack of ways of integrating what is known into what is done.
As post-Reformation and post-Enlightenment politicians are fond of saying,
the problem of morals is actually a problem of education. If we need to
explicate for our children the rules of moral behaviour and then inculcate them
into those artificial modes because they can no longer learn to be ethical
merely by participating in a culture, if ethics are not learnable in an
apprentice-like manner, osmotically through immersion in exemplary
behaviour, then we have a very unsustainable society. It is unsustainable not
because it is destroying nature, but because it has no nature. Its
unsustainability is its lack of an ethics, not because some within it behave
unethically. And the absence of the 'naturalised artificial' that is ethics is
unsustainable, as without it no authentic moral education can take place to
repair such a lacuna.
Aristotle called this learning gap between morals and ethics akrasia: knowing
the right thing to do and yet not doing it.It t] In terms of ethics as ethos, this
situation is impossible: there is only doing right; this is how one knows that
one knows what is right; by having done it practically without thinking. Plato
also thought this situation was impossible, but for the reverse reason: to fully
know is to be compelled to do; to fail to do so evidences a failure to think
things through completely, to completion. Heidegger would suggest that
Plato's re-emphasis - not doing as knowing, but knowing so doing - opens
up the possibility of akrasia - knowing without yet doing From then on,
the space that learning must bridge between knowing and doing what is
ethical grows. Learning must occur as acculturation, in Greek paideia, in
German Bi/dung, to form people into the type of subjects who feel the
compulsion to act in accordance with what is reasonable.
However, it is apparent, particularly with the crisis of sustainability, that this
mythical Romantic project of a formative education has been interrupted.[1
Knowledge of what is right is no longer being accompanied by doing right. It is
widely acknowledged for example, that sustainability is a strangely
hypocritical politics: even when issues are well understood, actions fail to
result; strong and comprehensive awareness of sustainability fails to translate
into sustainable behaviour.[ 4] The icon of modern akrasia is perhaps what
UNEP calls the 'Global Consumer', actively concerned about sustainability
whilst shopping avidly.[1 Such a bipolar figure is not so much unethical as
without ethos, without a way of learning to align their ethics with their life. He
or she is small child forever espousing sustainability without the ability to
transition to being sustainable. And to this extent, our cultures' explicit interest
in sustainability is symptomatic of our unsustainability, of the fact that we are
culture without the ability to acculturate, a non-culture with an irreparable lack
of ethos.
the ethics of things
There are two things wrong with this rather pessimistic picture of the world's
ethics. I will spend most of what follows talking about the first of these, and
only toward the end willi turn too briefly to the second.
The first thing wrong with the prelude to this article is its lack of things. Ethics
has always been associated with human-to-human relations. Products,
artefacts, built environments, communications, have only entered the ethical
domain as tangential, and therefore neutral means, used by humans in their
relations to other humans. To date, things, designed things, have not
assumed a central or at least symmetrical, role with humans when it comes to
ethics.
Yet, the cultural perspective adopted on ethics in the preceding account
suggests the significance of things. The debates of anthropological discourse
have drawn attention to the extent to which cultures comprises not only social
relations, but also material relations, shared products and environments that
are not only the instruments of social relations or the bearers of symbolic
meanings, but also essential aspects of that culture in their own right. A viable
ethos is not only sustained by a material culture, but exists in that materiality;
an immaterial culture is an impossibility.
In this case, it is crucial to understand the role of the design of things in ethics.
Beyond the ethicality of the designer and his or her clients, users and
stakeholders, is the ethicality, that is, the materialised ethics, of designed
products, environments, and communications themselves. Without taking
account of the ethics perpetrated by things, one risks being left, as in the
prologue to this article, suspecting that we live in an 'asociety'. While ethics is
now a discursive issue for us, and therefore evidently lacking as integral to
our human-to-human relations, that we do nonetheless live in some sort of
society, with a continued optimism about change by social learning, must
mean that there is an ethos somewhere in how we live, a non-discursive
sociality that is preserving the possibility of discourse and thereby the
transformative regeneration of an ethics.
I am here paraphrasing what Bruno Latour has cleverly called 'the missing
masses. Theoretical physicists find that the universe is imbalanced when
one only takes stock of all the material things in it. They have therefore been
forced to theorise that there is a hidden mass somewhere other than in what
we currently call matter that holds the universe together. For Latour the
converse is true in relation to modern societies. If we only take stock of what
we currently understand by 'sociality', it does not add up; our societies should
have long since collapsed into irretrievable immorality. There must therefore
be an ethical force hidden beyond what we now call 'the social', in other
words, in thinqs.l t Things must be acculturating or ethos-generating. What
things design, that is to say, the intentions, actions, understandings and
relations that things are designed to design, that they design beyond what
their designers intended, and that they are redesigned to design by those who
use them, must be a vital part of any ethos with a future.
With this in mind, the question is not, 'what can material design learn from the
philosophy of ethics?', but, 'what must the philosophy of ethics learn about
design and the axial role of designed things in conserving, promoting and
altering what is ethical?' Not, 'how can design become ethical?', but, 'how can
design be understood as already ethical, as making things ethical?'
rude things
To access the ethics of or in design, Latour works backwards, starting from
things that are unethical, or at least impolite.[ He finds an example of a
door that rudely will not shut itself after we have moved through,
inconveniently remaining an opening when, having served that function, we
now have need of a wall once again (for example, to keep the warmth in, a
gesture that honours us in the room and dishonours all those outside whose
resources we are destroying to keep warm). At a hotel, that bastion of imperial
civility, etiquette dictates that there be a doorman, showing respect to those
who pass in or out by shutting the door behind them. As Latour points out, this
is a clearly moral solution, that is, a particular historico-cultural evaluation of
the relevant stakeholders: the value of a door returning to its shut position
plus the value of the time and effort of the person passing through the door
exceeds the value of the doormen. Such an econo-moral solution is in no way
ethical, at least with respect to the doorman's workplace satisfaction, and, in
typical fashion, Latour remarks that the original problem returns when the
unionised doorman decides to strike for a more rewarding job. It is at this
point that the designer is called in. The brief - to devise a mechanism that
shuts the door automatically after it is opened - appears neutral enough,
though in the context of Latour's tale, the ethico-politico truth is clear - break
the strike, render someone unemployed.
The ethicality of the resulting design does not only lie at its origin, withdrawing
after the design's implementation, but continues into its uselife as becomes
clear when we assess the politeness of the resulting design - let's say a
spring, that clever way of capturing the energy of those who open the door so
that it can be used to shut the door. For most people, the spring shuts the
door politely, efficiently, and reliably. But, depending on the specification of
the spring, for some people, the door shuts too quickly (e.g., for those carrying
bulky items), for others too slowly (e.g., for those trying to keep a wet wind
out), and for others still the door refuses to open, so much effort is required to
compress the spring (e.g., for the elderly).
By convention, we judge a design by its functionality, and in these cases
would find the spring to be under-optimised. This judgment however is not a
particularly strong motivation for undertaking the task of redesigning the
spring: maybe someday someone will be interested in the intellectual
challenge of enhancing the performance of the spring. What would prompt a
quicker redesign is judging the performance of the spring in terms of its
human equivalent, the person it made redundant: in other words, if this spring
were a doorman, it would be a very rude one, selecting who gets to proceed
through and at what rate, and outrightly discriminating against many types of
people - children, pregnant women, the infirm, etc. Exposing the immoral
nature of the spring in this way would motivate the immediate recall of the
designer, that expert in making things 'right', that is, morally better.
So we begin to glimpse the ethics in things, the ethos that things enact.
what things know and feel
A more poetic and less cynical account of the ethics in the design of things is
provided by Elaine Scarry's stunning The Body in Pain: The Making and
Unmaking of the World. Latour's analyses certainly offer instructive
accounts of the ethical nature of things, but, from the point of view of design,
Latour's work is not helpful for understanding how things come to be ethical,
how ethics manages to be put into designed things. Intriguingly, it is Scarry's
interrogations of torture techniques, as exemplars of utterly unethical
'unmaking,' that allow her to understand the making of ethics. Scarry
demonstrates, in many ways, that making can only be understood as ethical
through and through. What initiates making, and sees making through to the
made, and what the actual process of making involves, is ethics.
Her massive argument, violently schematised here, is something like: humans
are fundamentally empathetic, so that to acknowledge pain in another is to
wish it gone - hence the torturer is fundamentally inhuman; to wish strongly
pain were gone for another in a permanent way, covering whenever you can
not be there in person for the one in pain, is to dream of a world that would
care for the one in pain itself; focusing this dream leads to a projection of
some particular thing that could be made that would take that particular pain
away. Making is therefore inspired by the ethical desire to enduringly relieve
another's pain (or enhance their pleasure), and when successful, the outcome
is an ethical thing whose nature and function is relieving pain (or pleasing). In
a most beautiful way that I cannot go into here, Scarry also demonstrates how
the act of making itself can be understood as essentially the act of being
ethical materialised; it is the perception of pain-be-gone objectified, or more
exactly, the empathetic 'dance' by which one gets an understanding of
another's pain sculptured in space rather than time.
Scarry follows this argument through in numerous ways, but of particular
pertinence here is her ability to capture phenomenologically how in everyday
life, even non-designers experience and expect things to be moral. When we
move through nature and are hurt, tripping on a rock, we are struck by how
inert the material world is, how insensitive things are to our fragility, our
susceptibility to being hurt by a badly placed rock for example. In reaction, the
project of making, of remaking the natural world, replacing it with built
environments, is an attempt to make the world more respectful of our human
condition. Design is the process of trying to make the world friendlier to us
clumsy humans; it is the effort to make the world more caring toward us, more
accepting of us and so more morally acceptable to us. Just as Latour sees
design as the means for making things less rude, Scarry reveals creation to
be the process of investing the world with an emotional intelligence, a
knowledge of our feelings. To the non-designer, the surprising pleasure that
comes from something well-designed lies with the fact that such an artefact
seems to know exactly what it is that we feel; it even seems to know our
feelings better than we have ever been able to articulate.[2 At these
moments, we are jUdging the outcomes of human making by how sensitive
they are to our needs, how attentive they are to what is particular to us.]?
What we are judging is the extent to which that designed thing has realised
this ethicality in how it is, as opposed to its merely appearing to; we are
assessing whether it has that empathic quality in its ethos, or whether it is
merely reiterating what makes it look like it might be moral.
Scarry's evidence for this materialised ethics by design is the scorn with which
we punish designed things when they lapse from this ethos. When a product
inadvertently hurts us, our naturalised reaction is to hurt it back. For Scarry,
this response is not childish, but evidence of the extent to which we take for
granted the ethicality that design puts into the world. We hit the door that
pinches our fingers in an attempt to re-sensitise what has suddenly emerged
as being inertly insensitive or dumb. A more sophisticated version of this
animism is the product liability court case, which attempts to establish how
perceptive a product needs to be about the range of uses to which it might be
subject: the product that does not manifest as warnings or safety features the
awareness of certain scenarios that we believe that 'the average person in the
street' would foresee, is expelled from our society (i.e., recalled by the
manufacture for disposal), just as any person unfamiliar with our manners is.
things as moral educators
With this last point, another aspect of design as ethics emerges, one that
returns us to Latour. Scarry's products, environments and communications
take care of us not only by relieving us of existing pains but also by
anticipating possible future pains. If in the process of taking care of us, a
product risks harming us in other ways, then, for it to be ethical, for it to be
'forethoughtful', the product must limit our ability to so harm ourselves. In this
case, it is not only passively ethical, receiving and thereby taking our pain
away, but actively ethical, orienting us away from harm's way. In fact,
invariably for a product to do what it is designed to do it must direct us to use
it in the particular ways that allow it to do what it is supposed to. It is animate
not only in being ethically sensitive to human fragility, but also in interacting
with humans, influencing them into the relationship needed for it to be
ethically sensitive. Latour refers to these interactions between things and
people as hybrids.
For rhetorical reasons, Latour focuses on these more active examples, where
things are not merely ethical, but moralising. Since he is arguing that ethics is
not merely a matter of and for humans, but a matter that involves a wide
continuum of actors from the human to the non-human, he foregrounds cases
where non-human things are strong ethical actors. In these situations,
humans, rather than convincing each other in human-to-human ways (e.g., an
education campaign about the evil consequences of speeding), delegate
agency to things through designs that either make easier what should done
and more difficult what should not (e.g., speed humps), or do not allow what
should not be done and force what should (e.g., an acceleration pedal that
disconnects from the engine when one is exceeding the speed limit).
Designing then not only inscribes into things a description of human being, but
also an ability for things to prescribe to humans how to be. It precisely
because the things we vivify by design have this ongoing force that we from
time to time get concerned about the controlling of technology. Having
animated such things to make us ethical, we often find it difficult to halt these
golems.
An intriguing extrapolation of Latour's argument about ethical delegation to
designed things has recently been developed in the context of sustainability
by Jaap Jelsma. Jelsma begins with the recognition that at least a decade
of information and education by governments and non-government
organisations about more sustainable behaviour, no matter how well
researched in terms of behaviour change models, has on the whole failed to
lead to significant improvements of the sustainability of developed nations.
He notes that the return to the focus of policy initiatives of merely
technological solutions - i.e., research into breakthrough technical efficiency
gainsl23) - is evidence of governments, or at least the EU, giving up on
moral education in the face of widespread akrasia. However, rebound effects
such as increased volumes and use of more efficientdevices to the point of
outstripping the initial per unit efficiency gains, already represent the return of
the repressed issue of 'ethos'.
In response, Jelsma takes Latour's descriptions of moral things as a
prescriptive design brief. It is not a matter of either behaviour change or built
environmenUtechnology change, but behaviour change through built
environmenUtechnology change. If the latter can be designed to be ethical in
terms of accessibility or safety by dictating appropriate use, why can the latter
not also be designed to be a source of ethicality in terms of sustainability? To
this end, Jelsma presents a series of examples of devices that 'script' certain
types of sustainable behaviour, in this case, water conservation with toilets.
The first way of establishing the ethos of ethical water use is by prompting
toilet users consciously via a semiotic design strategy - e.g., the dual flush
toilet with the two buttons signed in some way. The second influences toilet
users in pre-conscious ways via affordances for usability - e.g., the dual
flush toilet that assigns the conventional 'press' to the half-flush, requiring you
to counter-intuitively 'lift' the button for a full flush, or 'continue to hold down'
the button if out of habit you mistakenly press when one in fact you need a full
flush The third influences the toilet users in unconscious ways via system
design - e.g., grey and black water recycling systems.
Jelsma recognises that the way these designs design behaviours, moulding
users into moral actions, is not deterministic. It less behaviourism, than
ecologism in Bateson's sense. It is less a type of planning, than a situated
enabling. The scripts are more or less 'open,' only ever making an ethical
outcome easier or harder; they are always able to be tactically subverted by
the user. In fact, Jelsma recognises that the less open the script, the more
likely it is to provoke counter-moral 'work arounds' in reaction to its impolite
impositions. Nevertheless, the point is that by embodying certain ethical
positions, these sorts of designs educe ethical ways of living - which, as
sustained new ways of living, have greater consequence than mere eco-
impact reduction of the production of the product - without the futile
didacticism of moralising about sustainability. The ethics in designed things
manage to form ethical beings more effectively than any information. By
corollary, every designed outcome can be assessed in terms of how ethical it
is, that is to say, how effective it is in facilitating and promoting more ethical,
or in this case, more water-respecting, ways of being.
Importantly - and in ways that surpass Latour's analysis - Jelsma's shift
into the realm of more designerly applications shows that increased levels of
moral devolvement to designed things is not merely a matter of efficiency or
expediency. It is not that ethics by design/in designs is just better at educating
people to be more ethical than education alone. What is significant is that
ethics by design/in designs is more of an ethos. It is not a short-cut but an
identity, creating ethical ways of living through the inseparability of material
things and the things that are done with them.Izo By being embedded in
material culture, in the only ever semi-conscious everyday rituals of making
use of designed products, environments and communications, ethics by/in
design is the only sustainable form of ethics, the only form of ethics that can
sustain itself. If we are dependent upon what we design to live, and what
we have designed is ethical, that is, designs ethical ways of being, then we
are consequently ethical in how we live, irrespective of whatever platitudes we
are trained to mouth.
ethical difficulties
There are clearly dangers in what Jelsma outlines. To an extent he is
embracing the way user-centred design only manages to service the user by
unethically caricaturing the user.[28] There are limits to the
anthropomorphising of things - they have limited capacity for understanding
us, particularly in relation to our habit of changing - and this bites back as
reductive projections onto us of who and how we are. Whilst aiming at a
dispositional ethics, open yet embedded, a certain instrumentalism risks
returning the result to moral conventionalism. Nevertbeless, his proactive
adoption of Latour's idea of delegated morality, further substantiates Scarry's
reading of the designed world as a sustaining source of ethics.
The danger within what Jelsma advocates is in fact a wider danger with the
way I have presented ethics as ethos - and here I am mentioning the second
omission from my prelude. Ethics becomes a hypocritical or 'akrasiatic'
morality, that is to say, it becomes mere displays of the appearance of
ethicality rather than being ethical, when it becomes automatic. The child
whining 'thank you' has effectively become a machine, a product following the
design of a program. In these cases, ethics is being pursued as an explicit
intention, a goal in itself, rather than for the other, out of respect for the
otherness of the other. For this reason we should be hoping for a more
ingrained ethics. However, such an organic ethics itself risks the same
automaticity. And when ethics becomes a naturalised artificial, its habitual
accomplishment risks being unethical should things change. It does not
matter that the ethical is done intuitively, 'without thinking,' so long is it is
done; but when situations change, such an unthinking ethics becomes
immoral.
The traditional way to avoid this danger is to focus entirely on ethics as
thoroughly conscious deliberation. This is for instance what Findeli does to
resist the risk of 'technicising' ethical decisions: "the ethical decision always
requires total moral engagement on the actor's part ... the ethical decision
must begin anew for each individual case. I have not dealt with this
aspect of ethics at all because, in the context of this paper and its desire to
foreground the materialised aspects of design ethics, it is too anthropocentric.
What is needed next is an account of such deliberations that involve non-
human actors, where the prescriptions that things make are given voice as
constraints and variables in those ethical conversations.[30]
By way of conclusion though, I would like to indicate a different yet related
critique of what has been presented here, culminating in Jelsma's 'moralising
machines'. For Albert Borgmann, the ethics of designed things lies in the
extent to which they foster the best in us. ] Borgmann calls things that
enable and promote activities that require our sustained yet bodily active
attention to diversely creative outcomes 'engaging. He contrasts these
with 'disburdening' things, things designed to relieve us of the need for activity
or attention by delivering predetermined outcomes. In Borgmann's philosophy
of technology, the latter risks reducing us to receptive machines, no longer
challenged into being more adept humans. Importantly, this unethical
outcome is the result of a zealous designing in Latour's and Scarry's sense.
Designers, ethically motivated to take others' pain away, invest things with the
sensitivity to intelligently direct humans into use patterns that maximise
disburdenment. For Borgmann, the most ethical designer, best attuned to the
needs of others, will generate the least ethical outcome, the one that most
fully services others needs, thereby disabling them. The more ethical outcome
is the thing that is perhaps not the most transparently usable: it is the thing
that still involves some pain to use, some work. By being less than completely
polite, somewhat drawing attention to itself, its materiality and its design, such
a thing would enable ethical ways of being, that is to say, ways of being that
remain available for case-by-case deliberation by not withdrawing beneath
immediate satisfaction.
Borgmann's perspective prevents the sort of materialised ethics explicated by
Latour, Scarry and Jelsma from sliding into an unethical total moral design.
But it does so by reasserting the materiality of that ethics, the material
resistance such an embodied ethics can have, which therefore preserves our
human need to continue to work at being ethical, a labour that no technology
can replace.
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The Missed Encounter Albany: SUNY, 1998 and D. Fryer The Intervention of the
Other: Levinas and Lacan on Ethical Subjectivity New York: Other Press, 2004.
F. Varela Ethical Know-How: Action, Wisdom, and Cognition Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999. This book is a translation of 3 short lectures. The ideas
mentioned in it are explored in more depth, though with less direct reference to ethics
in The Embodied Mind Cambridge: MIT, 1991.
Design Issues, vol.10 nO.2 (Summer 1994). Whilst there are moments of 'being
ethical without moral knowledge' in Findeli's systems related thinking, he is actually
focusing on a more deliberative idea of the ethics of designing, i.e., the non-technical
decision making of ethical designing. I will return to this.
Theoria referred originally to the activity of Solonists who would travel to other
lands to witness significant rites and then report back on what they had seen,
attesting to their having taken place. This account of the etymology of 'theory' is
taken from Wlad Godzich by Gregory Ulmer, Heuretics: The Logic of Invention
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, 120-1.
Aristotle's discussion of akrasia, traditionally translated as 'incontinence', occurs
in Book VII of the Nichomachean Ethicsm 1145a 15-1154b 33: The Complete Works
of Aristotle Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, Vol 2.
See 'Plato's Doctrine of Truth' in Pathmarks Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998.
See Jean-Luc Nancy 'Myth Interrupted' in The Inoperative Community
[Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
The fact that project's like Doug McKenzie-Mohr's Fostering Sustainable
Behaviour (www.cbsm.com) which translates health behaviour change models to
recycling and composting programs, is successful evidences the failure of
sustainability 'awareness raising' initiatives to date.
McCann-Erikson conducted some market research for UNEP's sustainable
advertising project that was summarised in the 2002 publication, Can Sustainability
Sell?, available at: http://www.uneptie.org/pc/sustain/advertising/publications.htm
(last accessed 1 July 2004): "It is clear that young people today have strong
concerns about the principles that sustainability highlights. These fall into three key
areas: the protection of the environment, animal testing and human exploitation in
developing countries. With such strong and consistent views from across the globe,
why aren't today's youth doing more? One of the main reasons for inactivity is the
contradiction in the minds of these consumers. They are both hedonists and idealists.
They want to 'Have it All': a sustainable planet and their favourite brands. This is the
'use and throw' generation, but at the same time, they have dreams of a private and
wonderful world. Most importantly they are not aware of the consequences of their
own shopping behaviour. There is a feeling that they are 'unable to change the
world'. Yet they want the world to change." (10)
Where are the Missing Masses?: The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts' in
W. Bijker and J.Law (eds) Shaping Technology /Building Society Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1992; also at http://www.ensmp.frl-latour/articles/1992.html(last accessed 1
July 2004).
Ethan Watters makes the analogy between Mark Granovetter's concept of 'weak
ties' and 'dark matter' in Urban Tribes New York: Bloomsbury, 2003, however
Latour's contribution is to find the missing mass in matter rather than unrecognised
social relations.
I am here paraphrasing the first half of 'Where are the Missing Masses?'
[ Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. In what follows, I am closely
paraphrasing much of the last chapter, 'The Interior Structure of the Artifact'.
Harold Nelson and Eric Stolterman usefully characterise this as 'the expected
unexpected' or the 'the surprise of self-recognition' in relation to designed outcomes
in The Design Way: intentional change in an unpredictable world Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Educational Technology Publications, 2003.
Scarry's strong humanism at times risks essentialising individualism. Whilst on
the one hand what is intriguing about designed products are the way they do manage
to be perceived by people as 'custom-made' even though 'mass produced', it is
important to acknowledge that it is precisely people's inabilities to balance their own
individual perceived needs with the wider needs of others, including non-humans,
that leads to unsustainability: a device that services my needs perfectly is inevitably
going to be unethically unsustainable in the resources it consumes to do so. I will
return to the way my paraphrase of Scarry is conflating need fulfilment with
ethicalness briefly at the end of this article, but for now I will inadequately point to an
ambiguous point in Findeli's 'Ethics, Aesthetics and Design' where he notes that 'an
in-depth revision of the notion of 'needs" is needed for any more comprehensive
ethical system: 57. To this end, he cites Tomas Maldanodo's genealogy of comfort
and Tony Fry's attempts at thinking through a non-essentialist notion of need, neither
of which Findeli endorses without saying why.
See 'Innovating for Sustainability: Involving Users, Politics and Technology' in
Innovation vol.16 no.2, 2003. Other versions are available online: 'Design of
Behaviour Steering Technology', www.ifz.tu-graz.ac.at/sumacad/saOOjelsma.pdf
(last accessed 1 July 2004); and 'Philosophy Meets Design, or How the Masses are
Missed (and Revealed Again) in Enviro'nmental Policy and Ecodesign',
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/esf/philosophy.htm (last accessed 1 July
2004).
As a I write this the Australian Federal Government has announced its decision
to divert its funds from greenhouse gas emission abatement strategies - ie
programs aimed at reducing output - to greenhouse gas emission sequestration
strategies - eg storing liquefied carbon dioxide in fossil fuel aquifers: with regard to
the precautionary principle, this scientistic hope that problem can simply be buried is
a clear instance of the unethical essence of what is presented as moral action.
Jelsma only uses Latourian terminology and so remains at the level of 'product
semantics.' I am supplementing his work by introducing Donald Norman's work on
'afforded usability': see The Design of Everyday Things New York: Basic Books,
2002. This second example I give is also not one directly discussed by Jelsma.
On this distinction see Lucy Suchman's Plans and Situated Actions Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987.
[26] Perhaps, following Francois Julien's way of translating the Confucian and Daoist
notion of shi, a designed ethos is best termed The Propensity of Things [the title of
his book: New York, Zone, 1995].
A colleague of Jelsma's takes this point further, still within the context of
developing the sustainability of our societies, though with a more sophisticated
understanding of the interface between social relations and ritualistic use of
appliances: Elizabeth Shove Comfort, Cleanliness and Convenience: The Social
Organization of Normality Oxford: Berg, 2003.
Jelsma cites favourably Steven Woolgar's famous critique of the way usability
testing is not only about modifying the product, but also about 'enrolling' users:
'Configuring the User: The Case of Usability Trials' in John Law (ed) A Sociology of
Monsters London: Routledge, 1991.
'Ethics, Aesthetics and Design', op cit, p62. Most work in this context takes up
Aristotle's concept of phronesis: see for example Joseph Dunne Back to the Rough
Ground: Practical Judgement and the Lure of Technique [Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1993] and Bent Flyvbjerg: Making Social Science Matter. Despite
his commitment to deliberation, the point of Findeli's article is to assert a nexus
between ethics and aesthetics, one that he finds in "the systemic apprehension of a
complex reality [that] arises from intuition [his emphasis]." (63) I am suspicious of
this mimetological gesture which appears to return Findeli to an organic technicism,
or at least to a somewhat desparate faith in the long lost project of 'aesthetic
education' .
This is in fact one of Latour's current projects. Though see Tony Fry's review of
his latest book in the previous issue of Design Philosophy Papers
I am here paraphrasing Borgmann's 'The Depth of Design' in R. Buchanan and
V.Margolin (eds) Discovering Design, though the argument is made more fully in
Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984.
Mihalyi Czikzentmihalyi calls this zone of challenging creative action, 'flow'. See
Flow: The Psychology of Happiness London: Rider, 1992.
